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In this paper we propose a practical quantum key distribution protocol based on geometrically
uniform states and a standard decoy state technique. The protocol extends the ideas used in
SARG04 to the limit where the core quantum communication is secure against unambiguous state
discrimination and provides some level of inherent resistance to photon number splitting attacks.
Additional decoy state overlay ensures its conformity to the conventional security requirements. The
protocol security is analyzed by an explicit construction of the most optimal unitary attack, which
is known to reach the tight security bound in the case of BB84.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography is an actively developing tech-
nology that enables provably secure secret key exchange
between remote parties. Roughly speaking, its security
comes from the use of discrete elementary particles, usu-
ally photons, as information carriers. At the same time,
practical systems rely upon weak coherent pulses (WCP)
instead of true single photons mainly due to the present
technological limitations. That creates a whole bunch of
security issues compared with the perfectly secure orig-
inal single-photon-based BB84 protocol [1]. The well-
known threats are the photon-number-splitting (PNS) at-
tack [2] and the unambiguous state discrimination (USD)
in the channel [3].
Construction of an ultimately secure WCP-based
quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is one of the
central goals of the area. However, up to the present day,
there is no universal security proof for practical WCP-
based strategies. Currently, the approach based on the
decoy state BB84 is considered to be the most appro-
priate for implementations. At the same time, there are
open questions regarding its security proof, which rather
assumes a PNS-based attack and thus limits the univer-
sality of its claims.
It is well-known that WCP-based implementation of
the plain BB84 is insecure starting with quite moderate
loss levels [3], while better alternatives were developed
as early as 2004 [4]. The goal of the current paper is to
extend the best solution from that time and combine it
with the now conventional decoy state technique. The
resulting QKD protocol is secure not only due to the
employed decoy states, but is also immune to attacks
due to its superior inner structure.
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In the following text we will assume a phase encoding
scheme, which better suites for fiber based implementa-
tions. In this scheme each source pulse is split into two
equal halves at different time slots and the relative op-
tical phase between them encodes the information. We
also assume that source WCPs have randomized optical
phases. The paper is organized as follows: first we define
a QKD protocol with geometrically uniform states (GUS)
and find out a set of parameters convenient for practical
implementations. Second, we discuss the structure of
the transmitted quantum states and analyze its security
against an optimal unitary attack. Finally, we apply the
decoy state overlay and find the security bounds for the
resulting QKD protocol. In the last sections we calculate
key generation rates under typical conditions and discuss
the obtained results.
II. QKD PROTOCOL WITH GUS
The protocol with GUS uses N distinct geometrically
uniform quantum states defined by a unitary transforma-
tion U , such as UN = I. So |ψj〉 = U
j |ψ0〉. In the case
of phase encoding |ψj〉 = |α〉1 ⊗ |e
i 2pi
N
jα〉
2
, indices 1 and
2 belong to the two time slots, where the coherent states
|α〉 are located. It is clear that this general framework
includes such protocols as B92 [5] where N = 2, and
BB84 [1] and SARG04 [4] where N = 4. As in the BB84,
the states are grouped by pairs into N/2 logical bases:
each basis contains two states at a certain angle between
them that correspond to the logical 0 and 1. Examples
of different GUS protocols with certain bases choice are
shown in Fig. 1.
As the phase θ of the carrier coherent state |α〉 =
|eiθ|α|〉 is completely random, the information states in
the channel are mixed states with randomized phases,
2FIG. 1: Information states and logical bases in different GUS protocols shown as phasor diagrams. The bases are displayed
in different colors and marker shapes. 8-GUS protocols have two convenient choices of bases: with the angle between states of
∆ϕ = pi/2 or ∆ϕ = pi/4 as shown in the last two diagrams respectively.
described by a density matrix
ρ =
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
2pi
|ψ〉 〈ψ| . (1)
The same density matrix is obtained [6] with an inco-
herent mix of number states with Poissonian probability
distribution:
ρ(ϕ) =
∞∑
k=0
Pk(µ)|ψk(ϕ)〉〈ψk(ϕ)|, Pk(µ) = e
−2µ (2µ)
k
k!
,
(2)
|ψk(ϕ)〉 =
√
k!
2k
k∑
m=0
eimϕ|m〉1 ⊗ |k −m〉2√
m!(k −m)!
, (3)
where µ = |α|2 is the mean photon number in each of the
two coherent states. Due to the physical indistinguisha-
bility of the two interpretations, we are free to choose the
second one as more convenient for further analysis.
The proper choice of the alphabet size N is closely re-
lated to the protection of the system against the USD
attack. In general, the error-free discrimination between
N quantum states is possible when the states are lin-
early independent [7]. If we consider the number state
components of (2), USD of N states is possible only for
k ≥ N − 1 [8]. Therefore the probability of success PD
for error-free measurement is necessarily smaller than the
share of these components, i.e.
PD <
∞∑
k=N−1
Pk(µ). (4)
More accurate values for PD may be found using the the-
ory for the geometrically uniform coherent states [7, 9].
The corresponding probabilities calculated for common
choices of N as a function of the mean photon number µ
are plotted in Fig. 2.
If PD is larger than Bob’s probability of detection, Eve
could in principle learn the whole key without producing
errors by doing the USD and re-transmission of success-
fully measured states. For practical systems where the
overall system efficiency is at least 10−6 . . . 10−5 it is safe
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FIG. 2: Probability of successful error-free discrimination of
N GUS as a function of the mean photon number. The solid
line shows the exact result, while the dashed line is the trivial
upper bound given by (4).
to use N = 8, while the common choice of N = 4 cannot
be considered secure. Presumably, the USD attack may
be detected with the decoy state approach, however, to
the best of our knowledge, there are no known bounds
for USD attacks under the decoy state strategy. It has
to be mentioned that an implementation of the USD at-
tack does not require non-demolition measurements of
the photon number as well as any quantum memory.
Thus, it could be much more affordable for potential
implementation than, for example, the PNS attack dis-
cussed later. Following this argument, we consider the
case of N = 8 to be of the most practical importance,
while N = 16 could be used for future implementations
where much lower system efficiencies up to 10−12 could
be safely tolerated.
The choice of the angle between states in a logical ba-
sis is also directly related to the system security. As dis-
cussed in [4], the use of non-orthogonal states makes the
protocol much more secure, compared with the orthogo-
nal case of e.g. BB84. The difference becomes apparent
3if we consider an adversary implementing the PNS at-
tack, after which she can keep the exact copy of each
delivered photon in her quantum memory. After the ba-
sis reconciliation, all logical bases become known and if
the states are orthogonal it is possible to deterministi-
cally measure them and learn the whole key. If, on the
contrary, the states are non-orthogonal, the adversary
will only have limited information about the states due
to their non-orthogonality. The probability of successful
error-free discrimination between the two states in the
logical basis is bounded by
pUSDk = 1−|〈ψk(ϕ0)|ψk(ϕ1)〉| = 1−
[
cos
(
∆ϕ
2
)]k
, (5)
where ∆ϕ = ϕ1−ϕ0 is the angle between the logical zero
and one, and k is the number of available photons. For
the case of the 8-GUS protocol, the convenient choice of
the angle ∆ϕ is pi/2 or pi/4. The former gives higher key
generation rates, while the latter can tolerate higher bit
error ratios.
III. PROTOCOL PERFORMANCE UNDER
UNITARY ATTACK
So far we discussed the protocol behaviour under zero-
error attacks, where Eve could learn the whole key with-
out causing errors. That is, however, not enough for a
quantitative analysis of the protocol security in a general
case.
A unitary attack is a construction of an optimal uni-
tary operator, which creates quantum entanglement be-
tween the information states in the channel and an aux-
iliary quantum state (Eve’s ancilla). The modified infor-
mation states propagate further down the line to Bob,
while the ancillae are stored in Eve’s quantum memory
until bases are disclosed during the reconciliation stage.
At this time Eve can perform a collective measurement
over all her quantum memory to get the maximal amount
of information about the key. The optimal strategy for
Eve is to maximize this information given a fixed value of
the observed quantum bit error ratio (QBER). It should
be mentioned [10] that unitarity of the attack does not
lead to any loss of generality, as any physical non-unitary
action may be described by a unitary evolution of a larger
system. The same adversary strategy was used earlier to
construct an explicit attack that reaches the tight secu-
rity bound of Qc ≈ 11% for the BB84 protocol [11].
The engineering of an optimal eavesdropping operator
is quite a complicated task, while calculation of a conser-
vative upper bound may be done much easier. For the
sake of this calculation we assume that Eve knows logical
bases at the time of her interaction with the states in the
channel, so her goal is to create a unitary operator for
optimal discrimination between the two non-orthogonal
states within the basis. It is known [10, 11] that optimal
strategy for Eve may be attained by a symmetric uni-
tary attack, where roles of logical zeroes and ones may
be swapped. That also means that bit errors, observed
by Bob follow properties of a binary symmetric channel.
Under that assumption we may write the following ex-
plicit form of this attack.
Denote |Ψk(0)〉 = |ψk(ϕ0)〉, |Ψk(1)〉 = |ψk(ϕ1)〉, and
ck =
∣∣ 〈Ψk(0)|Ψk(1)〉 ∣∣ in the known logical basis. Af-
ter the performed entangling operator, global quantum
states are written as
|Φk(0)〉BE = UBE(|Ψk(0)〉B ⊗ |E〉E)
= Ak|Ψk(0)〉B ⊗ |Ek(0)〉E
+Bk|Ψk(1)〉B ⊗ |Ek(1)〉E ,
|Φk(1)〉BE = UBE(|Ψk(1)〉B ⊗ |E〉E)
= Ak|Ψk(1)〉B ⊗ |Ek(1)〉E
+Bk|Ψk(0)〉B ⊗ |Ek(0)〉E ,
(6)
where UBE is Eve’s unitary action, |E〉E — Eve’s an-
cilla, and |Φk(0, 1)〉BE is the resulting entangled state of
Eve and Bob; |Ek(0, 1)〉E is the modified ancilla, and the
parameters Ak and Bk are defined by the choice of the
unitary operator. The goal of Eve is to achieve a maximal
separation between |Ek(0)〉 and |Ek(1)〉, which is defined
by their scalar product cEk =
∣∣
E〈Ek(0)|Ek(1)〉E
∣∣. When
modified states arrive to Bob, we may consider them to
be mixed states with traced out Eve’s subsystem:
ρk(0, 1) = TrE
[
|Φk(0, 1)〉BEBE〈|Φk(0, 1)|
]
. (7)
Next, we define Bob’s measurement procedure to find
the relation of cEk and the observed probability of er-
ror on Bob’s side. Although, unperturbed states may
be discriminated by an optimal POVM with the proba-
bility (5), practical systems use a suboptimal projective
measurement approach. The phase of the receiving delay
interferometer is adjusted to detect either logical zero or
logical one, so the performed projective measurement is
the following resolution of identity
Ik = |Ψk(j)〉BB〈Ψk(j)|+ |Ψ
⊥
k (j)〉BB〈Ψ
⊥
k (j)|, (8)
where j = 0, 1 is the chosen measurement. The first
addend corresponds to the inconclusive result, while
the second indicates a successful detection of the state
|Ψk(1 − j)〉. The probability of successful discrimination
given the measurement is correctly chosen is then
Pk(0|0) = Pk(1|1) = TrB
[
|Ψk(j)〉BB〈Ψk(j)|(
Ik − |Ψk(1− j)〉BB〈Ψk(1− j)|
)]
= 1− c2k
(9)
If the states are modified by Eve, Bob sees correct bits
with the probability
Pk(j|j) = TrB
[
ρk(j)
(
Ik − |Ψk(1− j)〉BB〈Ψk(1− j)|
)]
= |Ak|
2
(
1− c2k
)
,
(10)
4and error bits with the probability
Pk(1− j|j) = TrB
[
ρk(j)
(
Ik − |Ψk(j)〉BB〈Ψk(j)|
)]
= |Bk|
2
(
1− c2k
)
.
(11)
The observed QBER is then
Qk =
|Bk|
2
|Ak|2 + |Bk|2
. (12)
Without loss of generality we may assume that Ak and
〈Ψk(0)|Ψk(1)〉 are real. Then, from the normalization of
|Φk(j)〉 it is easy to show that both Bk and 〈Ek(0)|Ek(1)〉
are also real. As follows from the unitarity condition of
UBE ,
ck 〈Φk(0)|Φk(0)〉 = 〈Φk(0)|Φk(1)〉 . (13)
Substituting (6) into (13), we obtain
ck
(
1− cEk
)(
A2 +B2
)
= 2(1− c2kc
E
k )AB, (14)
which in turn can be directly tied to the induced QBER
level using
2AB
A2 +B2
=
√
1− (1− 2Qk)2. (15)
The desired bound on Eve’s states separability given
the observed QBER is then
cEk (Qk) =
ck −
√
1− (1− 2Qk)2
ck
[
1− ck
√
1− (1− 2Qk)2
] . (16)
Having found the maximal separation of the ancilla
states for a certain level of the induced QBER, we can
calculate the corresponding bound on the available secret
information. After conclusive Bob’s measurements, Eve
has the following reduced density matrices:
ρEk (0) =
A2 |Ek(0)〉 〈Ek(0)|+B
2 |Ek(1)〉 〈Ek(1)|
A2 +B2
ρEk (1) =
A2 |Ek(1)〉 〈Ek(1)|+B
2 |Ek(0)〉 〈Ek(0)|
A2 +B2
(17)
The conditional entropy between Alice and Eve is
bounded by the Holevo quantity χk(Qk) [12, 13]:
Hk(X |E) ≥ 1− χk(Qk), (18)
where
χk(Qk) = H
(
ρEk (0) + ρ
E
k (1)
2
)
−
H
(
ρEk (0)
)
+H
(
ρEk (1)
)
2
,
(19)
It can be calculated using the following equations:
H
(
ρEk (0) + ρ
E
k (1)
2
)
= h
(
Λk(Qk)
)
, (20)
where the eigenvalue Λ±k (Qk) =
(
1± cEk (Qk)
)
/2 and
h(x) = −x log(x) − (1− x) log(1− x).
Similarly,
H
(
ρEk (0)
)
= H
(
ρEk (1)
)
= h(λk) (21)
with the eigenvalue
λ±k (Qk) =
1
2
(
1±
√
1− 4Qk
(
1− cEk (Qk)
2
)
(1−Qk)
)
.
(22)
Thus, we have found the expression, that gives the
lower bound on the conditional entropy Hk(X |E) for a
certain level of the induced QBER. To calculate the secret
key rate in realistic conditions we take into account that
the observed bit error rates are in general larger than
their theoretical bounds, while the detection probabilities
are lower. We use the barred versions of corresponding
variables to show the observed quantities.
The total probability of detection for the k-photon
component is
P k =
1
2
(
P k(0|0) + P k(1|0) + P k(1|1) + P k(0|1)
)
,
(23)
while the corresponding QBER is
Qk =
P k(1|0) + P k(0|1)
2P k
. (24)
The overall probability of detection is
P =
∞∑
k=0
e−2µ
(2µ)k
k!
P k, (25)
and the asymptotic secret key rate equals at least
R(µ) =
∞∑
k=1
e−2µ
(2µ)k
k!
P k
[
1− χk(Qk)
]
− P h(Q), (26)
where Q is the total observed QBER. The information
P h(Q) is the minimal information leakage required for
classical error-correction in the Shannon limit.
IV. DECOY STATE PROTOCOL FOR THE
PRACTICAL BOUND ON THE SECRET KEY
RATE
As Alice and Bob do not know the values of P k and
Qk for each of the k-photon components, practical sys-
tems need to comply with a more conservative approach
based on measurable parameters only. The decoy state
approach [14] allows to find corresponding bounds for the
single-photon component, which is enough to guarantee
a delivery of secret information.
According to the decoy state strategy, besides the stan-
dard pulses with the mean photon number of µ, weaker
“decoy states” with the corresponding numbers of ν1 and
5ν2 (0 ≈ ν2 < ν1 < µ) are randomly chosen. Due to Eve’s
inability to tell whether a particular pulse was sent as a
decoy or as a regular one, a straightforward PNS attack
would result in a measurable deviation of the statistics.
If we reasonably assume that a k-photon component has
the same behavior regardless of the original amplitude of
the coherent state, we can find direct relations between
its detection parameters and some measurable quantities.
In particular, it is shown that the minimal probability of
detection for a single photon component is given by [14]
P 1 ≥
1/2
ν1 − ν2 −
ν2
1
−ν2
2
µ
[
P (ν1)e
2ν1 − P (ν2)e
2ν2−
ν21 − ν
2
2
µ2
(
P (µ)e2µ − P0
) ]
,
(27)
where
P 0 ≥ max
{
ν1e
2ν2P (ν2)− ν2e
2ν1P (ν1)
ν1 − ν2
, 0
}
. (28)
Similarly, the upper bound on the single photon com-
ponent QBER is
Q1 ≤
e2ν1P (ν1)Q(ν1)− e
2ν2P (ν2)Q(ν2)
2(ν1 − ν2)P 1
. (29)
In principle, it is possible to find similar bounds for k ≥ 2,
but it would require more than three different amplitudes
of the source states [15]. Not only it makes the whole sys-
tem less practical, but also the contribution to the overall
secret key rate severely decreases with k. Therefore, most
practical systems rely upon the single photon component
only, and effectively, truncate the sum (26) to just only
the first term with k = 1:
R′(µ) = 2µe−2µP 1
[
1− χ1(Q1)
]
− P (µ) h
(
Q(µ)
)
. (30)
As one can see, this expression is based on measurable
parameters only and, thus, can be used in realistic sys-
tems for estimation of the secret key rate.
V. ESTIMATION OF SECRET KEY RATES IN
REALISTIC SYSTEMS
It is clear that without Eve’s actions the system per-
formance is defined by the linear optical loss in the
line and the detector efficiency η. If the bases of Alice
and Bob match, the probability of detection for a sin-
gle photon component is P 1 = pd + η(1 − c
2
1)T (L)/2 =
pd + η sin
2(∆ϕ/2)T (L)/2, where pd is the detector dark
count probability per single detection window, T (L) is
the overall optical system transmission coefficient, and
the factor of 1/2 is the probability of having a correct
measurement choice. Similarly,
P k = pd +
1
2
(
1−
[
1− η sin2 (∆ϕ/2)T (L)
]k)
. (31)
From the above results it is easy to show that the mea-
sured overall detection probability for signal pulses is
P (µ) = pd+
1
2
(
1− exp
[
− 2µη sin2(∆ϕ/2)T (L)
])
, (32)
while the corresponding QBER is
Q(µ) =
pd
2P (µ)
(33)
The same expressions may be written for decoy states by
replacing µ with ν1 and ν2.
This is now enough to estimate the performance of a
realistic system. Using the above values for P (x) and
Q(x) (x = µ, ν1, ν2), we calculate the “observed” bounds
on P 1 and Q1, and substitute them into (30) to find
the asymptotic secret key rate. As an example, we use
the following typical values of the parameters: η = 0.1,
T (L) = 10−aL/10, where a = 0.2 dB/km, pd = 10
−6.
To maximize the efficiency of the parameter estimation
for the single photon component, we use the following
mean number of photons for decoy states: 2ν1 = 0.05 and
2ν2 = 10
−3. Signal states are assumed to have the fol-
lowing mean photon numbers: 2µ = {0.1; 0.25; 0.5; 0.9}.
To better visualize the results we use the following per-
formance figures: the first is a secret key rate per sifted
key bit, defined as R′(µ)/P (µ). It is of great practical
importance as it defines the minimal amount of key ma-
terial compression required for achieving the goal of key
distribution. The second figure is the normalized secret
key rate R′(µ)/[ηT (L)], which tells how many secret bits
we get compared to an ideal single photon based commu-
nication line. It allows to compare secret key generation
rates in different configurations.
Calculation results are shown in Fig. 3. As follows from
the plots, the smaller µ the higher is the secret key rate
per sifted key bit. At µ = 0.1 almost all the information
in the sifted key is secret. It is the consequence of the
fact that at such µ almost all detected states were emitted
with just one photon. On the contrary, higher µ leads to
the decrease of the single photon component. The overall
key rate normalized to the system efficiency ηT (L) is
higher for larger µ as more photons reach the detector. In
fact the value of 2µ = 0.9 is nearly optimal for a channel
length of 100 km in terms of the generated amount of
secret information.
VI. DISCUSSION
Construction of a secure and at the same time practical
QKD protocol is a hard problem. So far the most pop-
ular approach has been the use of the decoy state BB84
protocol. Its construction is directly focused on the pro-
tection from the PNS attack, which is also assumed in
its standard security analysis. However, from a practi-
cal point of view, we must admit that realization of the
PNS attack is very far beyond current technological capa-
bilities: it requires both non-demolition photon number
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FIG. 3: Calculated secret key rate per sifted key bit (top) and the normalized secret key rate (bottom) for the 8-GUS protocol
as a function of the channel length L. Two columns correspond to different values of ∆ϕ, and curves in each plot vary by the
mean photon number µ for signal states.
measurement and pretty good quantum memory. On the
contrary, the USD attack may be implemented on-the-fly
with a quite complex, but available technology. It does
not require lossless channels or quantum memory. The
measured states may be retransmitted at arbitrary power
to compensate for any extra loss between Eve and Bob’s
detectors. Therefore, it is wise to consider the USD at-
tack to be of more potential danger to practical systems.
At the same time, the USD attack may be successfully
used to break the plain WCP-based BB84. As for the
decoy state approach, it is, to the best of our knowledge,
an open question, whether it guarantees security against
this or any combination of the USD with other known or
unknown attacks. Moreover, no experimental realization
is perfect and any compromising of the decoy state gener-
ation hardware directly renders the system insecure even
if the adversary is limited by the available technologies,
i.e. cannot perform PNS.
In this paper we presented a simple solution imple-
mented at the protocol level, which can be seamlessly
combined with the conventional decoy state technique.
The provided protocol is not only robust in terms of
the negligible probability of the USD, it also extends the
ideas coined in [4] that allow to severely limit Eve’s in-
formation after a successful PNS attack: logical organi-
zation of quantum states into non-orthogonal pairs dis-
allows their deterministic measurement.
It is worth mentioning that the increased number of
the proposed logical bases leads to more information loss
during key sifting. The same way as the key generation
rate in SARG04 is less than in BB84, our protocol is twice
less efficient than SARG04 if ∆ϕ = pi/2 and even worse
if it is pi/2. However, the main argument for a QKD sys-
tem design is its security and not the key generation rate.
Modern symmetric ciphers offer unprecedented security
level and are widely considered to be as safe even with a
quantum computer equipped adversary [16, 17]. So there
is no real need to generate gigabytes of one-time-pad key
information: it is more than enough to have symmetric
key change once in several seconds. Thus, this minor
drawback cannot be significant in real applications. All
other parameters, such as the maximal transmission dis-
tance, are quite similar to those of conventional protocols.
In conclusion, we constructed a QKD protocol based
on N geometrically uniform states. It provides inherent
protection from the USD attack by the choice of large
enough N . Non-orthogonality of logical states in each
basis limits the ability of an adversary to perform the
7PNS attack, which in addition is suppressed by the over-
layed decoy state construction. We provide an extensive
security analysis of the proposed protocol by consider-
ing a general symmetric unitary attack, and give suc-
cinct relations for the asymptotic secret key rate in the
case of N = 8. The protocol assumes its straightforward
experimental realization by a slight modification of the
conventional hardware.
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